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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Constitutional Law-Delegation of Nonjudicial
Duties to the North Carolina Superior Courts
Milk Commission v. Galloway1 inferentially raises a problem con-
cerning the delegation of nonjudicial duties to the North Carolina
Superior Courts. Galloway was a milk producer adversely affected
by an order issued after hearing by the Milk Commission fixing the
rates for hauling milk from producer to distributor in several counties.
Galloway, who had received notice of the hearing, did not attend but
appealed from the order to the superior court. Pursuant to the North
Carolina Milk Commission Act,2 that court heard the matter de novo
and issued its own rate order which conformed to the Commission's
order.3 The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding the Milk
Commission Act constitutional as applied.
It is well settled, since the leading case of Nebbia v. New York,4
that a state legislature in the exercise of the police power can regulate
the price of milk through an administrative board. The transportation
rates in the principal case were an increment of the price of milk and
thus within the area of regulation constitutionally granted to the Milk
Commission.
The court in the principal case stated that the appellant attacked the
power of the superior court to fix the transportation rates. An examina-
tion of the record on appeal, however, reveals that appellant's argument
was not based on the theory that the superior court was exercising
nonjudicial duties, but rather that the particular rates in question were
not authorized by the act. The court noted the appeal provision of the
act,5 describing it as a "sedulous protection against abuse of power by the
Milk Commission," and concluded, "[W] e hold that the Milk Commis-
sion, and the Superior Court on appeal, had the power .. .to regulate
a-:d to fix transportation rates"0 for the hauling of milk in North Caro-
lina.
1249 N.C. 658, 107 S.E.2d 631 (1959).
2N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-266.6 to -266.21 (Supp. 1959).
3 Biltmore Dairies, distributor, had assigned its producers to routes served by its
trucks and charged the producers for transporting the milk from the farm to the
plant according to the average cost per cwt. on each route. The costs varied from
about seventeen cents per cwt. to about thirty-one cents per cwt. depending upon
the route. The average cost per cwt. for all milk transported was twenty-six cents.
The orders of both the Commission and the court decreed that Biltmore in the
future use the overall average cost per cwt. (here twenty-six cents) as the basis of
its hauling charge to the producers.
4291 U.S. 502 (1934).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-266.17 (Supp. 1959).6249 N.C. at 667, 107 S.E.2d at 638. (Emphasis added.)
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This language of the court points toward two interpretations of the
function of the superior court: first, that it is to guard against the abuse
of power by the Milk Commission, and second, that it may itself fix
rates and otherwise regulate the milk industry. Guarding against the
abuse of power by an administrative board is a traditional function of
the courts.7 The fixing of rates is usually held not to be a judicial func-
tion."
A judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities
as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed
already to exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation, on
the other hand, looks to the future and changes existing condi-
tions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some
part of those subject to its power. The establishment of a rate is
the making of a rule for the future, and therefore is an act legis-
lative not judicial in kind .... 9
Nonjudicial duties in certain instances have been delegated to the
courts both directly and indirectly. An example of the direct grant of
nonjudicial duties to a court is found in State v. Hurber,10 where a
statute that authorized courts of record in West Virginia to hear pro'-
ceedings for the revocation of beer licenses was found to give the courts
legislative power and was declared unconstitutional. A direct imposi-
tion of a nonjudicial function such as deciding whether a beer license
should be revoked is obvious enough. An indirect method of imposition
where, as indicated by the principal case, the court's scope of review
of administrative action is enlarged by statute is not so easily recognized.
The Connecticut court, recognizing this latter type of imposition, has
limited the review of administrative action to the single question: "Did
the board act illegally ?""
Several states whose constitutional provisions concerning the separa-
tion of governmental powers are basically the same as those in the
7 "The court has inherent authority to review the discretionary action of any
administrative agency, whenever such action affects personal or property rights,
upon a prima facie showing ... that such agency has acted arbitrarily, capriciously,
or in disregard of law." In re Wright, 228 N.C. 584, 587, 46 S.E.2d 696, 698
(1948). For a discussion of the function of the courts in reviewing administrative
action see DAvis, ADmINIsTRATv LAW §§ 244-57 (1951).
'But see People v. Willcox, 194 N.Y. 383, 87 N.E. 517 (1909), where rate
fixing was held to be a judicial function.
'Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908) (Holmes, J.).
See also Administrative Procedure Act § 2(c), 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001(1958).
10129 W. Va. 198, 40 S.E.2d 11 (1946).
""On an appeal from an administrative board . . . the function of the court
is to determine whether or not it acted illegally .... Where upon an appeal the
court hears evidence it is solely for the purpose of determining that question . .. ;
even where a statute required that an appeal should be tried de novo, we held
that the court should make an independent inquiry into the facts but only for the
purpose of exercising that function." Jaffe v. State Dep't of Health, 135 Conn.
339, 353-54, 64 A.2d 330, 337-38 (1949).
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North Carolina Constitution have considered the problem of delegation
of nonjudicial duties to the courts. There is a wide diversity of opinion,
however, as to what duties may be delegated to state courts. In the
field of local government it has been held that courts may be empowered
to grant certificates of incorporation to municipalities,' 2 determine the
existence of facts which would warrant the creation of a water district,13
erect and divide political subdivisions,' 4 and appoint persons to investi-
gate county and municipal affairs.' 5 Whether the foregoing functions
may be classified as judicial is seriously doubted. On the other hand,
courts cannot be authorized to determine if the annexation of an area
was in the public interest or convenience,' 6 or to fix, within certain limits,
the salaries of the court's medical officer, probation officer, and secre-
tarial staff.'7 In the field of utility regulation it has been held that the
courts could not fix rates,'8 or otherwise regulate utilities;19 yet one
decision has intimated that courts can perform these duties.20 It is
generally held that courts may not issue licenses for the operation of a
business ;21 however, it was held constitutional for the lower Georgia
courts to grant liquor licenses.22
When called upon to exercise a nonjudicial function, some courts
have felt constrained by the exigencies of the particular case to perform
the inappropriate duty. For example, in In the Matter of Town of
Chesapeake many towns had been incorporated by the West Virginia
circuit courts under a statute that authorized those courts to issue a
certificate of incorporation upon the petitions of local citizens. The
appellate court recognized that the circuit courts were performing
patently nonjudicial duties; however, it upheld the statute on grounds
of public policy to avoid rendering doubtful the legal existence of many
towns.
In the Matter of Town of Chesapeake, 130 W. Va. 527, 45 S.E.2d 113 (1947).13Culley v. Pearl River Industrial Comm'n, 234 Miss. 788, 108 So. 2d 390
(1959).1, In the Matter of Borough of Pottstown, 187 Pa. Super. 313, 144 A.2d 623
(1958) (Court of Quarter Sessions had performed this function since the earliest
days of the Commonwealth.).
' Massett Bldg. Co. v. Bennett, 4 N.J. 53, 71 A.2d 327 (1950).
11 Ritche v. City of Brookhaven, 217 Miss. 860, 65 So. 2d 832 (1953).
17 State ex rel. Richardson v. County Court of Kanawha County, 138 W. Va.
885, 78 S.E.2d 569 (1953).
" Public Serv. Comm'n v. City of Indianapolis, 235 Ind. 70, 131 N.E2d 308
(1956).
29 Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Fort Dodge, 248 Iowa 1201, 85
N.W.2d 28 (1957).20 Florida Power Corp. v. Pinellas Util. Bd., 40 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1949) (dic-
tum).
" Langen v. Badlands Co-op. State Grazing Dist., 125 Mont. 302, 234 P.2d 467
(1951); Peterson v. Livestock Comm'n, 120 Mont. 140, 181 P.2d 152 (1947);
State v. Hurber, 129 W. Va. 198, 40 S.E.2d 11 (1946).
22 Carrol v. Wright, 131 Ga. 728, 63 S.E. 260 (1908).
23130 W. Va. 527, 45 S.E.2d 113 (1947).
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Another factor has influenced courts which have accepted non-
judicial duties. Under the doctrine of separation of powers a spirit of
co-operation must exist between the branches of government in order
for the parts to function as a whole. At times, therefore, the courts
have acted as legislative agents. In New Jersey the court did s6 by
appointing persons to investigate corruption at the local level. In hold-
ing the delegation valid, the court stated,
A legislative request . . . for the judiciary to act with respect
to any particular subject matter is not to be lightly declined and
such matters are to be passed upon . . . in the spirit of comity
that should prevail between the three branches of government. 24
It is difficult to ascertain North Carolina's position on the per-
formance of nonjudicial duties by its superior courts. The only case
directly concerned with this point, In re Wright,25 held that the superior
court could conduct a trial de novo in reviewing the discretionary
suspension of a driver's license. The court recognized that the inherent
authority of the courts in reviewing administrative action26 had been
enlarged by the provision for this statutory appeal and found "that
the Legislature had full authority to impose this additional jurisdiction
upon the courts .... ,,27 Then the supreme court stated that this
jurisdiction did not constitute a delegation of legislative or administra-
tive authority and that the superior court could not substitute its dis-
cretion for that of the administrative body, thus implying that such a
delegation would be invalid. The court held that discretion to revoke
was not in the superior court which determined only whether the license
was subject to revocation. If so, the superior court does not decide
whether or not to revoke but affirms the administrative determination.
It is submitted that the Milk Comimssion Act, as interpreted in the
principal case, may have unwittingly provided through the appellate
process a procedure whereby nonjudicial functions are imposed on the
superior courts. This cannot be reconciled with the constitutional
separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers.28  The
superior courts are not the proper bodies for the regulation of an in-
dustry in the first instance, and the function should not be assumed
on appeal. Neither comity between the branches of government nor
the exigencies of regulating the price of milk require the imposition
of such an inappropriate burden upon the crowded dockets of our
superior courts. The General Assembly might well consider rewording
"Massett Bldg. Co. v. Bennett, 4 N.J. 53, 61, 71 A.2d 327, 331 (1950).228 N.C. 584, 46 S.E.2d 696 (1948).
"See note 7 supra.
' 228 N.C. at 587, 46 S.E.2d at 698.
"N.C. CoNsr. art. I, § 8; art. II, § 1; art. III, § 1; art. IV, § 2.
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the appeal provision of the Milk Commission Act 29 to prevent such an
occurrence. The appeal provisions of the Virginia Milk Commission
Act30 limit the court to determining if the order appealed is within
the discretion vested in the Commission, and if so, whether the Com-
mission has exercised a reasonable discretion or the order is unreasonable
or capricious. Legislative action would not be required, however, if
the supreme court were to adopt the Connecticut court's concept of
the purpose of a trial de novo on appeal from an administrative body8 '
and limit the superior courts to the determination of the single ques-
tion "Has the Commission acted illegally?"
G. DUDLEY HUMPHREY, JR.
Bankruptcy-Survival of Liability for Willful and Malicious Injury
The Bankruptcy Act' operates as a discharge or release of a bankrupt
from all his debts which are provable in bankruptcy, except such as are
excepted in the act, and has as its purpose to relieve the honest debtor
from the weight of oppressive indebtedness with leave to start afresh. 2
Where the liability or debt is the result of a judgment arising out of
automobile accidents the idea of discharge has met with considerable
criticism. This criticism may be illustrated by the language of a New
York case where it was said:
If the court were permitted to do moral justice instead of legal
justice it would refuse to discharge the bankrupt of the judgments.
There are too many accidents resulting in judgments which are
wiped out in bankruptcy. The practice has grown up wherein a
person will negligently operate his automobile and then when a
judgment for such injuries is rendered against him, will obtain the
protection of the Bankruptcy Law by filing a voluntary petition
in bankruptcy . . . Operators of automobiles may drive in a
careless and negligent manner and go unscathed of justice by
filing a petition in bankruptcy.'
Although liabilities which are the result of willful and malicious
injuries to person or property are not dischargeable in bankruptcy,4 the
courts are by no means in accord as to what constitutes willful and
malicious conduct. Most of the cases seem to lie between the areas
29 N.C. Gm. STAT. § 106-266.17 (Supp. 1959).
2 0 VA. CoDE §§ 3-369 to -371 (1950).
"' See note 11 supra.
'Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended by 66 Stat. 420
(1952), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1086 (1958).
'Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549 (1915).3 Francine v. Babayan, 45 F. Supp. 321, 322 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
4 Bankruptcy Act ch. 541, § 17, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1958).
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